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Chapter 3
Civil Society, Foreign Aid, 
and Donor Dependency 
in Transitional Myanmar
Maaike Matelski
After decades of being shunned by the international community, 
Myanmar1 has been witnessing a signifi cant increase in foreign donor 
interest in response to the political liberalization process that began with 
the country’s 2010 elections. Th is chapter discusses the impact of these 
increased funding opportunities on Burmese civil society organizations. 
In particular, it asks whether the increase in donor interest has 
strengthened their position and reduced dependency on donor agendas. 
In addition, it discusses the concern expressed by some observers that 
Myanmar might become ‘the new Cambodia,’ referring to a corruption 
of the development sector as a result of a sudden large infl ux of donor 
funding. Information stems from intermittent fi eldwork and interviews 
with representatives of Burmese civil society organizations and Western 
donors between mid-2010 and mid-2015. These data have been 
complemented with a literature review and analysis of published 
discussions from the fi eld, such as the postings on the Paung Ku Forum,2 
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which has been serving as an online platform for comments on donor 
practices in Myanmar for several years.
Burmese civil society’s reliance on Western donor funding
Non-governmental, non-profit organizations typically rely on 
external funding. In theory, funding for civil society can come from 
a number of main sources: governmental assistance, private donations, 
or contributions from abroad. In developing countries the fi rst two 
options are often ruled out, due to the generally high poverty level that 
limits both governmental and private spending. When governmental 
or private donors in such countries do have money to spare, they are 
often reluctant to spend it on independent organizations that might 
criticize the government (Parks, 2008). For governmental actors, the 
motivation not to fund such activities is obvious, but private donors 
too might risk repercussions if they come to be perceived as supporting 
dissent. Moreover, in the absence of a substantial middle class, wealth 
is often acquired in close collaboration with political and business elites, 
who will not support activities that might challenge the status quo 
(Parks, 2008). Th ese limitations are even more pervasive in authoritarian 
countries such as Myanmar, where funding for social or political activities 
is not only limited due to pervasive poverty, but also because many 
organizations attempt to stay under the radar of the government, either 
to avoid repression or to maintain credibility as independent organizations.3 
Th is situation has made Burmese civil society organizations highly 
dependent on foreign supporters for their fi nancial survival.
Within the broad fi eld of Burmese civil society organizations, 
we can distinguish religion-oriented (‘faith-based’) and secular-oriented 
civil society (I use the word ‘oriented’ since many of the ‘secular’ civil 
society actors still identify with a particular religion). Buddhist 
organizations and their followers can be regarded as the most traditional 
form of ‘religious’ civil society, and Buddhist leaders have been involved 
in the provision of education and other forms of social welfare since 
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pre-colonial times (Cheesman, 2003; Schober, 2011).4 However, the 
military governments that have been in power since 1962 have 
consciously sought to reduce the societal infl uence of Buddhist monks. 
Consequently, their social welfare activities have been largely restricted 
to the local level. Only Buddhist leaders whose discourse and actions 
reach beyond the traditional religious sphere and beyond their immediate 
communities have been in contact with foreign donors. 
In contrast, Islamic and especially Christian organizations in Myanmar 
have a longer history of transnational ties, and often receive foreign 
donations. Various Christian welfare organizations were started in the 
late-nineteenth century under British colonial rule, the forms and 
functions of which corresponded more closely to what the Western 
world viewed as development organizations (Heidel, 2006). Th ey were 
therefore more likely to establish partnerships with international 
Christian and other donor agencies (Kramer, 2009). Moreover, various 
Buddhist social welfare workers told me that they had been inspired by 
Christian organizations to take up development work, because many 
Buddhist followers restrict their donations to the immediate religious 
realm, rather than addressing the broader socio-economic needs of the 
community. In short, given the absence of suffi  cient community 
members willing and able to share their resources for social welfare, 
Burmese civil society organizations of all religious affi  liations (as well 
as those without an explicit religious affi  liation) have been highly 
dependent on foreign donor support in order to carry out their activities. 
Such support has been variously available during diff erent moments in 
time, but has generally been more limited than in neighboring countries. 
When searching for foreign donors, Burmese civil society 
organizations have a number of platforms from which to choose. 
Although geographically they can focus their eff orts on neighboring 
countries, in practice they often rely on Western donors instead. Th e 
type of Western donors potentially available to Burmese civil society 
organizations include multi-donor trust funds, multilateral aid agencies, 
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bilateral aid agencies, and international NGOs (Rieff el & Fox, 2013). 
Depending on the type of activities, a distinction can be made between 
humanitarian aid, development assistance, and general capacity-building 
for civil society, such as training and education. Some donors explicitly 
focus their support on one of these areas, while others engage in 
a combination. However, the overall level of donor assistance to 
Myanmar remained particularly low until the late 2000s.
Expansion and contraction of foreign aid under military rule
Following independence from British colonialism in 1948, while 
the global aid chain was developing on a large scale, Burma’s bilateral 
relations were characterized by the Cold War atmosphere and post-
colonial relations with the British and the Japanese, who provided 
technical support and post-war compensation (Steinberg, 2010: 36; 
45). Th e post-1962 government tried to remain neutral amidst Cold 
War rivalries, but eventually had to seek out economic assistance due 
to economic decline (Steinberg, 2010: 67). Bilateral and multilateral 
development assistance did not really take off  until the end of the 1970s, 
and was distributed exclusively through government channels. Japan 
remained the primary donor for decades, accounting for over 70% of 
the offi  cial development assistance (ODA) in 1987 (Banki, 2009).
Th e prospects for foreign assistance, however, have been limited by 
the sanctions that the Burmese opposition demanded and many Western 
countries imposed after the crackdown of the 1988 uprising, as well as 
by the government’s own restrictive rules and practices concerning 
foreign funding. Especially after the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) was denied power despite winning the 1990 elections, opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi and various Burmese exile organizations nearly 
unanimously called for divestment, including withdrawal of development 
assistance, which they argued primarily benefited the military 
government. By and large, the NLD and other opposition groups were 
eff ective in fostering the view that Western assistance was better 
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distributed to Burmese refugees and activists in exile than to actors based 
inside the country. Th is situation complicated the position of civil society 
organizations seeking to work inside the country under military rule 
(Pedersen, 2007).
Although Asian countries have not imposed political or economic 
sanctions on Myanmar, they have also not been particularly supportive 
of civil society activities. Japanese and Chinese aid has been distributed 
primarily through the Myanmar government, and has been used mainly 
for infrastructure projects.5 After 1988, many Asian countries such as 
neighboring Th ailand employed a policy of ‘constructive engagement,’ 
which was intended to have a long-term positive influence on 
democratization in Myanmar, while maintaining regional security and 
economic ties (Buszynski, 1998). India’s initial support for Burmese 
democracy activists was reversed in the course of the 1990s, when its 
‘Look East’ policy called for closer political and economic ties with its 
eastern neighbors (Egreteau, 2011). 
Th us, although Asian countries had a signifi cant political and 
economic infl uence on Myanmar during military rule, the opportunities 
for civil society actors inside the country to benefit from these 
relationships were virtually absent. On the contrary, the majority of the 
regional countries’ insistence on maintaining economic and political 
ties with Myanmar actually reduced the possibilities for non-state actors 
to obtain Asian assistance, as this would be seen as a sign of distrust 
towards the military government. Assistance to Burmese refugees and 
migrants in Asia has largely been funded by Western aid organizations, 
as many countries in the region have not signed the Refugee Convention 
and are reluctant to recognize the status of Burmese refugees. Even the 
tacit acceptance of Burmese exiles and refugees in neighboring territories 
was sometimes jeopardized, with offi  ces of Burmese organizations being 
raided by Th ai authorities when bilateral relationships required a fi rmer 
stance.
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Despite the Western reluctance to become involved in any activities 
taking place inside Myanmar, a number of developments from the 1990s 
onwards increased opportunities for local actors to obtain foreign 
fi nancial support. Th e ceasefi res reached in several ethnic minority areas 
in the 1990s expanded the opportunities for local organizations to 
establish activities in these ‘ethnic states.’ Th e post-1988 military 
government expressed interest in receiving international development 
assistance, as long as it was limited to areas under its control, and 
distributed through bilateral assistance or through UN agencies, rather 
than through independent non-governmental organizations (ICG, 
2002). Some of the ethnic insurgent groups that had entered into 
ceasefi res also sought international assistance in order to develop the 
infrastructure and economy in their regions, and international NGOs 
were able to enter the Kachin, Mon, and Karenni states after signing 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the government (Purcell, 
1999). In addition, the government sought out assistance to address 
the gravest humanitarian needs, such as poverty and HIV/AIDS, which 
it increasingly acknowledged (Pedersen, 2012). Opportunities thus 
increased for local humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations active 
in the accessible areas of the country. 
Humanitarian aid in Myanmar reportedly doubled between 2001 
and 2005, while also reaching more remote areas (ICG, 2006). Various 
Western organizations experienced an increase in humanitarian access 
in the early 2000s as a result of personal relationships with General 
Khin Nyunt. As the head of military intelligence and later briefl y prime 
minister, Khin Nyunt had facilitated the ceasefi res with various ethnic 
groups, as well as informal talks with Aung San Suu Kyi. In addition, 
he was responsible for foreign aff airs, and actively sought out international 
involvement in the country (Steinberg, 2010: 94). International 
organizations such as the ILO, UNHCR, and ICRC worked with Khin 
Nyunt to establish projects to reduce forced labor, facilitate prison visits, 
and increase protection for civilians in confl ict areas (ICG, 2006).
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When General Khin Nyunt was suddenly removed from power in 
2004, the ability of non-governmental organizations to work inside the 
country was directly aff ected. International organizations experienced 
reduced access to high-level government offi  cials, increased surveillance, 
diffi  culty obtaining permission for fi eld trips, and more pressure to work 
with government-affi  liated NGOs (ICG, 2006). As the climate for 
international organizations worsened throughout the course of 2004, 
both the UN Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and 
the French section of Médecins Sans Frontières decided to withdraw 
from the country. Th e increased pressure culminated in the ‘Guidelines 
for UN Agencies, International Organizations and INGOs/NGOs’ 
issued by the Myanmar government in February 2006, which imposed 
strict rules on registration, oversight, and funding of activities, and 
limited freedom to travel (ICG, 2006).6 As a result of this restrictive 
environment for international actors, local civil society organizations 
could only legally obtain foreign support through donors who had 
established an MOU with the government, which in turn implied further 
restrictions and surveillance. 
A new era in Myanmar’s humanitarian aid debate emerged in 2008. 
Cyclone Nargis struck the country in early May of that year, predominantly 
in the southern areas (Irrawaddy Delta and Yangon), resulting in an 
estimated 140,000 casualties, and aff ecting the livelihoods of millions 
of people. Th e military government’s inadequate response severely 
aggravated the catastrophe. Not only did the government lack the 
equipment, capacity, and willingness to respond to the vast humanitarian 
needs, it also initially rejected the international assistance that was being 
off ered from several sides (Larkin, 2010). Eventually, however, the UN 
managed to intervene, and a Tripartite Core Group was set up consisting 
of representatives from the Myanmar government, ASEAN, and the 
UN. 
Despite the initial restrictions on foreign aid entering the country, 
Cyclone Nargis and its aftermath put Myanmar more fi rmly on the 
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international aid map. Offi  cial development aid for Myanmar increased 
from $3US per person in 2006, to a still modest $10US per person in 
2008, then down to $7US in 2010.7 Th e number of international 
organizations active inside the country and their number of local staff  
rose signifi cantly, particularly in the delta area (Pedersen, 2012; Rieff el 
& Fox, 2013). Some of this humanitarian assistance later transformed 
into regular development assistance, leading to long-term relationships 
between Western donors and local organizations. Th e occurrence of 
Cyclone Nargis thus shifted the balance, with civil society organizations 
inside the country seeing increased opportunities for foreign assistance. 
Th e announcement that the fi rst elections in decades would be held in 
late 2010 further inspired Western donors to fund civil society activities 
inside the country, thereby hoping to contribute to ‘democratization 
from below’ (Matelski, 2013). Although some of this funding was labeled 
by donors as humanitarian assistance or democracy promotion rather than 
offi  cial development assistance, it did aff ect the total aid budgets available 
for Myanmar, and would eventually impact negatively on the fi nancial 
assistance available for Burmese activists and refugees based outside the 
country. Such developments illustrate the problem of donor dependency 
that has been discussed extensively in development literature.
Foreign aid and donor dependency
As the above overview shows, foreign donors may provide vital 
fi nancial and moral support in environments where the country’s own 
government and local actors are incapable or unwilling to do so. Yet 
donors have also been accused of prioritizing their own political, 
economic, and geo-strategic interests over the interests of benefi ciaries, 
of being insuffi  cient and inconsistent in their aid distribution, and of 
paying lip service to values such as development and democracy, while 
actually pursuing other agendas. Moreover, development assistance is 
known to come with certain preconditions and institutional requirements 
that may take a toll on recipients’ available time and resources. Many 
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aid recipients in developing countries face the challenge of making the 
most of available funding without becoming dependent on the whims 
and agendas of their donors. 
Despite the prominent discourse on partnership, the relationship 
between donor and recipient organizations is inherently unequal, since 
the donor decides if and how funding is allocated (Parks, 2008). Th is 
power imbalance has at least two potential consequences for aid 
recipients, namely having donor priorities and preferences imposed on 
them, and risking fi nancial or other forms of dependency on outside 
funding. Donors can infl uence recipients’ activities on a number of 
levels, including the length of the project cycles, the content and location 
of the activities, and the methods and language employed by staff  
members. Donors often place unattainable or unrealistic demands on 
their recipients in terms of reporting on their activities, which can make 
recipient organizations less eff ective and infl ate overhead costs. Moreover, 
they can infl uence how funding gets spent on the ground by imposing 
their own agendas, or even suggesting specifi c consultants and other 
staff  members to be included in the project.
While many of these requirements are ostensibly meant to ensure 
that funding is spent correctly and that recipient organizations are 
accountable to benefi ciaries, these practices may actually result in an 
excess of upward rather than downward accountability, with a signifi cant 
proportion of the resources eventually fl owing back to the donors’ own 
environment (Edwards & Hulme, 1998: 9). Moreover, it has been 
argued that donors are primarily interested in reports on how their funds 
have been spent, rather than on the outcome of the projects they 
fund, or the impact on the ultimate benefi ciaries (Mir & Bala, 2014). 
Mosse (2005a) even argues that development policies are designed 
retrospectively to fi t the reality on the ground, which ensures that 
project outcomes are evaluated as successful regardless of the actual 
impact. I will now discuss how donors may infl uence the projects, 
technicalities, and budgets of their recipients.
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Project cycles and content 
Donors are known to prefer project funding over long-term program 
aid and assistance for operational expenses. Projects are more limited 
in time and scope and therefore easier to monitor and assess in terms 
of process and outcome. Recipient organizations often have more trouble 
securing funding for salaries, offi  ce space, and other overhead costs, for 
which no tangible outcome can be demonstrated (Antrobus, 1987). 
However, this preference for project funding ignores the conditions 
required for successful projects to exist in the fi rst place. Knowledgeable 
staff , organizational stability, and the development of trust are essential 
for carrying out such projects, yet these aspects are the ones many donors 
are less willing to fund. Van Rooy (2001: 36) argues that the focus on 
projects “shapes organisations to manage the manageable...and so, 
inadvertently, to ignore the essential.” 
Donor preferences for short-term project cycles carry the additional 
risk of a sudden decrease in funding (Antrobus, 1987). Donors shifting 
priority areas or target countries have a significant impact on 
organizations whose activities may suddenly fall outside the donors’ 
focus. Such developments increase uncertainty within organizations, as 
well as competition among them. Not only can funding be withdrawn 
on relatively short notice, but donors are also known to shift priorities 
in terms of geographical location, substantive focus, or intended 
benefi ciaries. Recipients then face the choice between abandoning their 
previously established priority areas or looking for other funding sources, 
which requires a considerable time investment. In this way donors may 
infl uence not only the duration of the project, but also the substance 
of recipients’ activities. 
Technicalities, terminology, and reporting requirements
Technicalities that may be imposed on recipients include 
administrative processes, and the use of specifi c terminology and 
reporting practices. Such prerequisites might make it easier for donors 
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to assess performance and prevent corruption, but can also result in 
a box-ticking exercise with little or no relevance to the ultimate goals 
or benefi ciaries of civil society support.
Th e use of certain language and terminology, including acronyms, 
is a subtle way for development professionals to guard the boundaries 
between in-group and out-group, and thereby contributes to the 
‘governmentality’ of professionalized (I)NGOs (Li, 2007). Englund 
(2006) has noted how in Malawi, highly educated human rights activists 
uncritically accepted English as the lingua franca and showed contempt 
for others with diff erent or lower literacy skills, despite their stated 
intentions to empower poor communities. Similar tendencies can be 
seen in Myanmar with many international staff ’s inability to speak 
Burmese, or local staff ’s insistence on using Burmese in communities 
that speak one of the country’s many ethnic minority languages. 
Although many Yangon-based civil society actors do speak English (and 
some also speak one of the ethnic languages), the use of technical English 
terms can still create a distance to local staff  members in subtle ways. 
Similar observations have been made regarding the language used 
in donors’ policy documents and reporting requirements. Crewe and 
Axelby (2013: ix) argue that complex processes of social change are 
frequently reduced to “frameworks, tools, and formulae.” Th e use of 
donor keywords such as ‘community’ and ‘participation’ in policy 
documents may reassure the reader, as they suggest that the donor is in 
control of the funding process and its potential outcomes, without 
detailing what these concepts might look like in practice (Crewe & 
Axelby, 2013: 190). Technical requirements such as logframes and 
SMART goals are employed to socialize a diverse civil society landscape 
into the donors’ framework; Crewe and Axelby (2013: 185) refer to this 
bureaucratization as “moral taming of the unruly.”8 Some donors attempt 
to address the power imbalance between themselves and their recipients 
by avoiding tainted terminology such as ‘monitoring and evaluation,’ 
for instance, by referring to their evaluations as ‘sharing and learning.’ 
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However, changing the wording does not necessarily empower recipients, 
as they still have to report on their activities in a way that satisfi es the 
donors.
Potential donor recipients cannot avoid these practices, and thus 
spend a lot of their time learning what is expected of them and staying 
up-to-date on evolving donor preferences. Many have become 
increasingly adept at writing proposals in the form of neatly planned 
projects with clear timeframes and end goals, even though these activities 
are in fact part of a much longer and messier process. A separate ‘market’ 
of trainers, consultants, and manuals funded with donor money has 
also developed to teach proposal writing in a manner suitable to Western 
donors.9 Indeed, Western donors’ insistence on technical procedures in 
Myanmar seems to serve the goal of infl uencing the behavior of their 
recipients. Many Westerners working with Burmese civil society (and 
consequently, many civil society actors themselves) have complained 
that they are not being suffi  ciently ‘systematic’ or ‘strategic.’ A Westerner 
working with local civil society organizations explained to me that 
although logframes were ‘much dreaded’ in the fi eld, they played an 
important role in forcing actors to think ahead of what they want to 
achieve and why. Otherwise, they might be ‘doing activities for the sake 
of activities.’
Project budgets and the irony of scale
An over-focus on reporting requirements may actually result in an 
ironic discrepancy between the evaluation of donors and intermediary 
INGOs on the one hand, and recipient organizations on the other. UN 
agencies and large international NGOs have a monopoly position in 
Myanmar, as donors often choose to channel funding through these 
agencies, rather than directly to local benefi ciaries. I was able to observe 
a clear example of this while participating in a British civil society project 
on non-state education (Matelski, 2015). In 2011, I attended a closed-
door meeting in Yangon organized by UNICEF, which had invited 
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various non-state education providers to discuss its expanding role in 
the country’s education system. UNICEF announced that it had $60 
million US to spend on education, and was particularly interested in 
supporting non-state actors. Th e non-state education providers present 
at the meeting (both Burmese and foreigners), who were used to working 
with small budgets for many years, were initially very pleased and eager 
to share their thoughts on how the budget could be used to make 
education accessible to more children throughout the country. However, 
they were disappointed and even became somewhat emotional when 
UNICEF commented that it would only work with one or two 
centralized INGOs as local partners in order to shorten communication 
channels and minimize overhead costs. Th e atmosphere of working 
towards a common goal was quickly lost when participants in the 
meeting realized that precisely their ability to make the most out of 
small budgets made them ineligible for donor support. 
In the course of my research, I heard many more comments on UN 
agencies’ lack of cost eff ectiveness and their high overhead costs, which 
some estimated to be well over 50%. UN consultants and staff  members 
were also accused of elite practices, staying in expensive hotels, and 
refusing to mingle with the Burmese population, while sometimes 
working in close cooperation with military leaders. Although some UN 
agencies might have a long-term strategic impact on the country’s 
development, their immediate activities were not perceived favorably 
on the ground. In May 2014, UNICEF’s operations in Myanmar became 
subject of a public scandal when it transpired that the organization was 
renting offi  ce space from a former military general for $87,000US per 
month. After the initial news story, media reported that the World 
Health Organization, another UN agency, spent $79,000US per month 
on offi  ce space, amounting to 10% of its total annual budget for 
Myanmar (Kyaw Hsu Mon & Lewis, 2004).
Another complaint has been that the INGOs that have acted as 
intermediaries keep a disproportionate share of the funding for their 
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own organization. During a conversation in 2015, a representative of 
one of the largest development organizations in Myanmar complained 
about being forced to work with foreign partners such as INGOs, despite 
the extensive experience and sizable budget of the organization: 
Th e problem with EU funding is they say they want to 
fund local NGOs, but then they don’t provide seed funding. 
If you want to apply for funds, another institution has to 
put in 10%, for example. Where do you think local NGOs 
will get the 10%? Th at’s how they open up space for the 
INGOs. Because you have to compete with the INGO on 
the proposal, and in the same proposal 10% is provided 
by the international NGOs. You can do this, but don’t say 
it strengthens civil society, because it doesn’t. Th ey use all 
these words, you know, but don’t really mean it. All EU 
funding went to international NGOs, and then it must 
trickle down to the local NGO. Don’t call it our partner 
and then let us compete. Look at our funds; we manage 
more funds than some of the donors here. So why are they 
talking about capacity? Why not give it to the few NGOs 
that work with smaller NGOs? Why give it to the INGOs? 
Th is insistence on local organizations having to secure other funding 
sources before donor funding is allocated puts international NGOs in 
a uniquely powerful position, because they act as intermediaries for all 
substantial funding. Some of the largest local organizations try to reduce 
their dependency by forming a block against the international NGOs, 
but many of the smaller organizations are not in a strong enough position 
to bargain about the share taken by intermediary organizations.
An example provided by Paung Ku (2011) points to a similar 
tendency. In a short report, the organization discusses the 2011 ‘Good 
Governance’ program announced by the European Commission (EC), 
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which explicitly aimed to reach grassroots organizations. As the report 
explains, the application process and requirements set by the EC meant 
that they reached only those organizations that, among other things, 
could aff ord to spend at least $10,000US on a funding proposal, without 
any assurances that this would eventually be compensated by the EC. 
While aspiring to reach the grassroots, they were reaching mainly large 
INGOs, who could aff ord to hire external consultants. As a local NGO 
director commented in the report: “Th e EC think they are watering the 
plants, but the plants are somewhere else” (Paung Ku, 2011: 7). 
According to one staff  member, the European Commission’s Non-State 
Actors Programme was referred to in Yangon as the ‘Non-Local Actors’ 
Program: “While the EC objectives are focused on local civil society 
strengthening, the money is mostly snapped up by international 
agencies.”10 
Donors might also impose their own staff , consultants, or material 
resources as a prerequisite for funding (Antrobus, 1987). Th is tendency 
goes against the often mentioned objective of building local capacity 
and can actually create dependency. However, it also tends to infl uence 
the actual work that recipients of donor money can (or must) do. For 
example, Lall (2011) observed how Western donors and consultants 
presented the Child-Centered Approach as an essential aspect of primary 
education in Myanmar, and then benefi ted fi nancially by sending 
expensive foreign consultants to implement this approach. Th ese 
examples reinforce the perception of double standards, as recipients 
need to be transparent and accountable about all spending, while such 
requirements do not apply to Western donors and consultants.
Th e previously mentioned examples of donors’ varying standards 
towards international NGOs and local organizations point to what 
I call ‘the irony of scale’: the smaller the activity, the more rigid the 
reporting requirements. Following the logic of some of the largest, most 
bureaucratic donor agencies, a daily fee of $1,000US for external 
consultants may be justifi able as long as they can produce invoices for 
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their expenses and hourly rate, while a travel compensation of $1 or 
$2US for community members to participate in an activity may become 
problematic if the individuals are unable to produce offi  cial receipts. As 
Crewe and Axelby (2013: 186) note: “Th ere is a paradox between the 
low level of trust placed in professionals that has led to the perceived 
need for auditing and the high level of trust that attaches to auditors 
and evaluators.” Local organizations are viewed with suspicion and are 
judged by standards that do not apply to Western donor representatives 
or those evaluating projects on their behalf. Local civil society actors 
have no choice but to follow donor practice by cooperating with INGOs 
and spending a signifi cant percentage of their time and resources 
producing reports and evidence for their activities. Th ose who are able 
to operate on the lowest budgets are frequently told that they are too 
small and not capable of handling the amount of donor funding available, 
which is then distributed through INGOs instead. 
Partnership as a myth?
Th e increasing reference to principles of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ 
implies mutual accountability and cooperation between donors and 
recipients, yet observations by practitioners in Myanmar suggest that 
unequal relationships continue to exist. A regional civil society supporter 
conveyed to me in 2010 her anger about a meeting of a multi-donor 
trust fund in which a Western donor representative had arrived late, 
gave a fi fteen-minute presentation about partnership, and then left 
without interacting with the audience. She said this would have been 
inconsiderate in any circumstance, but especially in a setting where 
partnership is mentioned as an explicit topic. A Burmese respondent 
later presented a similar story, commenting: “We call this community-
blocking, not community-building. How will community members 
survive after the project is done? Th ey must learn to make their own 
decisions, to manage, to control the entire process.”
Gardner and Lewis (1996: 111) argue that the idea of participation 
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was initially introduced in order to challenge top-down notions of 
development, but has over time become almost meaningless, as 
community involvement is increasingly used “to legitimize decisions 
which have already been taken by powerful outsiders.” Even when 
community participation is considered inappropriate or undesirable, 
community consultation will often be presented as an integral aspect 
of a development intervention (Mosse, 2005a). Th e use of consultation 
meetings by large development organizations to signal ‘ownership’ is 
particularly notorious. On 12 January 2015, the director of Paung Ku 
commented on the organization’s Facebook page that “consultation 
meetings...are intentionally designed to prevent true participation of 
civil society.”11 Tactics he mentioned organizers used in order to avoid 
true participation included providing complex information with lots 
of jargon in English only or in a poor translation, giving long 
presentations with little or no time for questions and answers, or ending 
the session “when the civil society member is smart enough to grab the 
microphone.” In a critical blog on expat aid workers, this has been 
referred to as ‘facipulation’: a combination of ‘facilitation’ and 
‘manipulation’ to give the impression that workshop participants are 
listened to, while steering conversations in a direction that suits the 
interests of donors and their intermediaries.12 
Th e above examples show that many large donors—and inter-
governmental organizations in particular—have paid lip service to 
partnership in Myanmar. Some of the smaller donor organizations have 
shown more interest in interaction with benefi ciaries, for example by 
posting permanent staff  members in the fi eld. Others have taken 
a diff erent approach to partnership by co-authoring proposals with 
recipient organizations to submit to larger donor organizations. Although 
such ‘strategic partnerships’ potentially have an empowering eff ect on 
the local partner, there is a risk of recreating dependency patterns if 
local NGOs grow and become the new center of power in the fi eld at 
the expense of smaller organizations. 
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In short, Western donors have been indispensable for the survival 
of many Burmese civil society organisations during decades of military 
rule. Th eir involvement however has not been solely out of altruistic 
motivations, and should be assessed based on international standards 
and the experiences of those on the recipient side. My data indicate that 
Western donor assistance, even if well intended, has not always enhanced 
the recipients’ potential impact in the fi eld.
Seeking alternatives
Th e risks of donor dependency described above and the possibility 
of a sudden decrease in funding imply that civil society organizations 
might be better off  relying on community funding instead. Research 
on countries such as Bangladesh also suggests that NGOs that rely on 
local funding are more cost-eff ective and accountable to their benefi ciaries 
because they spend less of their resources on upward accountability 
towards donors (Mir & Bala, 2014). Moreover, Mosse (2005b: 5) has 
argued that “international aid policy frameworks continue to endorse 
globalisation as a process of economic and political freedom (democracy) 
and poverty reduction, despite the fact that free trade seems more clearly 
linked to growing inequality than gains in income or welfare for the 
poor.” A number of civil society representatives I spoke to explicitly 
rejected the preconditions that came with foreign donor aid, and instead 
relied on traditional regional or religious values for change.
One significant regional actor advancing Buddhism-inspired 
development is the International Network of Engaged Buddhists, which 
has a regional offi  ce in Th ailand under the name Spirit in Education 
Movement. A representative explained to me in 2011 that they were 
trying to learn from Christian organizations that had been more tightly 
organized and had succeeded in mobilizing youth for public causes. He 
rejected the materialism, migration, and ‘brain drain’ that he had 
witnessed in the region as a result of what he called ‘mainstream 
development,’ and wanted to show people that there are alternative ways 
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of developing. He explained that they relied on informal networks rather 
than public meetings and proposals to establish support for their 
activities. Yet this organization too has been supported by Western 
donors, acting as an intermediary between Western donors and local 
Buddhist organizations inside Myanmar that would likely be unable to 
obtain foreign funding by themselves. 
Since the mid-1990s, the organization has been running a ‘grassroots 
leadership training’ with the goal of empowering grassroots civil society 
in Myanmar. The first course was run with (Christian) Kachin 
communities, with subsequent trainings including many other ethnic 
minority groups. Th e goal was to include Burmans and Buddhists, and 
to “run regular inter-ethnic, inter-religious courses for other oppressed 
groups in the region” (Rabash & Hutanuwatr, 1999). Th e trainers pay 
particular attention to alternative forms of development based on 
“spiritual and cultural wisdom,” providing a more sustainable and 
spiritual alternative to mainstream development. In the course of many 
years, the organization has managed to establish a signifi cant network 
of alumni who are active in various sectors of civil society throughout 
Myanmar. Other organizations that have provided training in alternative 
forms of development include the Network for Environment and 
Economic Development (NEED-Burma), which seeks to offer 
alternatives to mainstream forms of development, including income-
generation projects such as starting organic farms (Garnett, 2014).
Although such programs are very popular with Westerners who are 
themselves supportive of alternative modes of development, it must be 
kept in mind that these activities target a minority of the Burmese 
population, as many are still preoccupied with improving economic 
circumstances for themselves and their immediate environment. One 
example that was provided from the previously mentioned grassroots 
leadership training concerned a man who had returned to his village 
after having participated in the training program abroad. When it 
became clear to his fellow villagers that he had returned with spiritual 
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rather than economic wealth, villagers started to question the use of 
investing in training and education when it would not bring any 
improvement to their daily lives. Th e man, however, insisted on the 
long-term benefi ts of newly-learned skills and worldviews.
Another option for civil society organizations to become less 
dependent on foreign funding is to turn to a business model, whereby 
the organization sells goods or services in order to generate its own 
sources of income. Th ese may include sales of goods such as the products 
of local farming, and materials such as education and training manuals, 
as well as providing trainings and hiring out staff  as consultants 
(Antrobus, 1987). Such activities are increasingly employed by 
Cambodian civil society organizations that have had to fi nd alternative 
sources of funding after the excessive distribution of aid came to a halt 
(Khieng, 2014). However, some of the Burmese organizations that have 
begun to hire out their own consultants quickly became known among 
other organizations as sell-outs, especially since they charged an average 
daily rate of $100US, which many potential benefi ciaries could not 
aff ord to pay, although it was still signifi cantly cheaper than the rate of 
foreign consultants. 
Moreover, Antrobus (1987) argues that organizations hiring out their 
staff  members as consultants may go against donor requirements that 
they hire Western contacts and experts as consultants in exchange for 
funding. To some extent, Western donors might have an interest in 
perpetuating dependency between donor and recipient in order to impose 
their own agendas, priorities, and experts. Although the goal of 
development assistance should ideally be to become superfl uous, there 
are few donors that withdraw due to successful completion of their goals, 
nor are there many civil society organizations that proclaim themselves 
no longer necessary (Cf. Van Rooy, 2001). Some Burmese organizations 
though have shifted focus as a result of increased possibilities to employ 
activities inside the country, as the return of several exile organizations, 
including media organizations, has demonstrated. 
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Myanmar’s post-2010 donor infl ux: Th e ‘new Cambodia’?
Since the transition from military rule to quasi-civilian rule started 
in 2011, Myanmar has seen a signifi cant increase in Western donor 
interest. In addition to large international development actors such as 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, new bilateral donors 
such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) have entered the country following initial diplomatic visits 
to test the waters. European countries too are reassessing their sanctions 
policies, and some European donors have announced a signifi cant 
increase in funding for Myanmar. To some extent, this has put civil 
society organizations in a more powerful position. While previously 
they were competing for a limited amount of donor funding, a new 
situation has emerged in which the demand for local partners almost 
outgrows the supply. As a result, several of my respondents who had 
earlier struggled to obtain donor funding by 2014 reported a signifi cant 
increase in funding from various sources. 
However, some observers worry that the amount of donor support 
that has suddenly become available cannot be absorbed by the existing 
fi eld of potential recipients. Rieff el and Fox (2013), for example, question 
whether the amount of foreign aid pouring into the country has been 
‘too much too soon.’ Th eir report compares the sudden infl ux of donor 
funding to earlier situations in Nepal and particularly Cambodia, where 
duplication and fragmentation occurred as the country’s governments 
seemed unable to absorb the amount of funding that had become 
available (it also cites Vietnam as a more positive example). McCarthy 
(2012), in writing about the ‘donor invasion,’ also warns that “Within 
fi ve years Myanmar could become a typical aid-dependent country.” 
Th e problems with aid in Cambodia have been largely attributed to the 
management incapacity of the central government. Th is problem has 
been less relevant for Myanmar in the past, as Western donors tried to 
bypass the government as much as possible. Th is situation started 
changing after the nominally civilian government took over in 2011. 
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Until the early 2000s, the aid situations in Cambodia and Myanmar 
were largely opposed to each other. Cambodia had gone from an almost 
complete elimination of civil society during the Khmer Rouge era to 
a sudden increase in donor interest after the establishment of the UN 
Transitional Authority in 1992. As a result, recipient organizations were 
ostensibly set up in response to available funds, rather than to local 
needs (Hughes, 2009). In Myanmar, however, repression of associations 
by the authorities has been an almost constant factor since colonial times, 
and civil society actors have become used to organizing themselves in 
various forms and adapting to the circumstances and limitations under 
military rule. As a consequence of Western reluctance (and Asian 
disinterest) until just a few years ago to provide development assistance, 
many civil society organizations inside Myanmar had become used to 
working with limited resources. Th us, the absence of large numbers of 
‘professionalized’ civil society organizations observed under military 
rule might paradoxically mean that associational life has remained more 
vibrant than in environments such as Cambodia, where donor assistance 
has been more sudden and primarily channeled through the government. 
While some use the Cambodia comparison to refer primarily to 
domestic socio-political processes, fearing the “cronyism, corruption, 
land grabs, social and environmental exploitation” that have been 
observed in Cambodia during the 1990s (Nicholson, 2014), others refer 
more directly to donor responsibility, warning against an absence of 
coordination, increase of elitism, and brain drain for local organizations 
as a result of the growing role of INGOs and UN agencies (Paung Ku, 
2012). Th e examples provided in this chapter show that some of these 
dangers also apply to contemporary Myanmar. 
Some donor representatives and even some recipients I spoke to 
questioned local organizations’ ability to spend the available funding in 
a way that would be acceptable to themselves and their donors. Th ey 
also pointed to the increased risk of donors duplicating each other’s 
work, due to unfamiliarity with the local context and the lack of public 
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reporting in the past. Local representatives further reported an increased 
demand for information as a result of the many ‘scoping missions’ that 
potential new donors have undertaken in recent years. Local staff  
members are expected to contribute their expertise for free, without 
being guaranteed funding in return. As this distracts them from their 
core activities, some have become reluctant to host new visitors. Local 
civil society leaders also worry that the establishment of new UN and 
INGO offi  ces in the fi eld is taking staff  away from local organizations, 
which have invested signifi cant resources into training their staff 
members but cannot aff ord to compete with international salaries and 
benefi ts. 
As a result of the loosening of sanctions, Western donors have begun 
interacting directly with government offi  cials. However, critics worry 
that Western governments and donors have started to rely too much on 
the guidance of the Myanmar government. For example, Phan (2014) 
complains that the British government is spending twice as much on 
government capacity-building as on strengthening civil society, and that 
support for government-approved civil society (i.e., registered 
organizations) may actually undermine ‘genuine’ civil society groups. 
Th e Myanmar Peace Support Initiative established in 2012 and the 
national census conducted in 2014 both received signifi cant Western 
donor assistance, despite being highly controversial on the ground.13 
Peacebuilding in particular seems to have become a new donor trend 
now that the Myanmar government and ethnic minority representatives 
have started engaging in peace talks, despite warnings from other confl ict 
environments that supporting an imbalanced peace process may actually 
do more harm than good (Anderson, 1999; Hindstrom, 2012; Jolliff e, 
2015). Nevertheless, donor-dependent recipients have little choice but 
to adapt their discourse and activities to these new donor interests.
Th e situation of Burmese activist and refugee organizations abroad 
and their ability to secure funding has also changed dramatically in 
recent years. Political and advocacy organizations that have managed 
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to create a role for themselves inside the country are able to benefi t from 
the increase in donor support, while those that remain outside the 
country have seen their funding options reduced (Phan, 2014).14 Th is 
also aff ects various ethnic minority organizations and refugees from 
regions such as Shan and Kachin states, where armed confl ict has not 
ceased. Spokespersons working with these organizations fear that they 
will become the victims of the international optimism about political 
change in Myanmar. Despite the fact that the ‘do no harm’ principle in 
aid debates has been primarily applied to confl ict situations, it should 
arguably be extended to donors that reduce funding to aid-dependent 
recipients because they discover a more interesting market, and not 
because the needs of previous recipients have been suffi  ciently addressed.
Th is situation again highlights the perils of Burmese civil society’s 
dependence on foreign aid. In some cases, the reduced aid options for 
Burmese organizations in exile have coincided with their own shifting 
orientation to developments inside the country. Activists who have 
moved back into Myanmar can benefi t from the increased donor interest 
in developments inside the country and help to counter the problem 
of brain drain as a result of cross-border migration. However, as this 
chapter has shown, Western donors’ increased focus on developments 
inside Myanmar has not always been accompanied by more attention 
for grassroots activities, and the risk of brain drain and high overhead 
costs might actually increase as UN and other international donor 
organizations have a stronger presence inside the country.
Conclusion
Many Burmese civil society organizations have long struggled to 
obtain the necessary funding to carry out their activities. The 
unavailability of suffi  cient funding within the country and in the Asian 
region forced many organizations to turn to Western donors for 
assistance. Th ese donors had to weigh the calls for disengagement made 
by Burmese exile organizations against the calls from local development 
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organizations for increased assistance. Moreover, the obstacles that the 
military government put up for Western donor involvement in the 
country made it diffi  cult for donors to reach the intended benefi ciaries. 
Nevertheless, donor presence slowly increased as a result of the ethnic 
ceasefi res in the 1990s, the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, and 
the political liberalization process since 2011. 
Th is increase in donor interest, however, has not always resulted in 
increased funding opportunities for Burmese civil society organizations. 
As in other developing countries, many donors have based their agendas 
and priorities more on their own insights and interests than on the needs 
and priorities of the target population. Th e preference for short-term 
project funding over long-term overhead funding, for example, has 
forced recipient organizations to continuously rephrase their activities 
in new terminology. In some cases, funding has been withheld or 
withdrawn because recipients could not live up to the reporting 
requirements of their donors, a development which is likely to have 
a negative impact on the intended benefi ciaries of their activities. Th e 
practice of certain large donors of imposing their own consultants, 
insisting on working with intermediary organizations, and spending 
a large proportion of the funding on their own overhead costs has 
contributed to a negative image of international NGOs inside the 
country. Some organizations have therefore tried to fi nd alternative 
sources of income, but these eff orts have so far had limited success. 
Th ose organizations that have been successful in ‘professionalizing’ 
themselves risk becoming subject to the same types of criticism that 
international organizations have been facing. 
Th e recent infl ux of donor agencies has increased opportunities for 
organizations inside Myanmar to obtain funding. However, the new 
situation creates a risk of duplication and fragmentation of activities, 
and places high demands on the limited number of civil society 
organizations that are considered suitable partners for Western donors. 
In addition, donors are reducing funding to Burmese activists and 
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refugees abroad while increasingly working with state actors, and have 
in some cases contributed to controversial government initiatives, such 
as renewed ceasefi re talks and a national census. Th ese developments 
demonstrate the risk of donor dependency for civil society organizations, 
and should encourage all actors to reconsider existing relationships of 
power and accountability between funder and recipient. While a few 
large development organizations have attempted to improve their 
negotiating position vis-à-vis Western donors, many of the smaller 
organizations lack the capacity and experience to talk back. Nevertheless, 
new initiatives such as IFI Watch Myanmar, a watchdog organization 
for large development projects started in 2012, may empower people 
on the recipient side of funding to collectively demand accountability 
(Mo Kham Nang & Nyo Yamonn, 2013). 
However, given the inherently imbalanced power relationship 
between donors and recipients, Western donors should also reconsider 
their own practices and be willing to change in order to increase aid 
eff ectiveness. Practices that would help recipient organizations develop 
and implement long-term strategies include assurances of long-term 
funding, willingness to fund overhead costs in addition to project work, 
and prioritization based on the specific needs of the intended 
benefi ciaries, which should also be refl ected in the reporting requirements. 
Th e situation in Myanmar shows that a countrywide donor strategy is 
insuffi  cient, as the political progress that has been made in some areas 
of the country has not spilled over to certain ethnic minority areas, 
where confl ict is ongoing and humanitarian needs are actually increasing. 
In order to decrease aid dependency, capacity-building programs should 
be aimed at long-term implementation of locally relevant capacities, 
rather than socializing recipients into Western donor priorities and 
practices. Lastly, Western donors and international NGOs should 
value experienced domestic actors with knowledge of the local context 
at least as much as external consultants that are brought in to provide 
technical expertise, by granting them responsibility for fi nancial and 
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strategic decision-making. Donor dependency may be an inevitable 
stage of development, but it should not be perpetuated by donors’ own 
practices.
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Notes
1. In line with Steinberg (2010), I use ‘Myanmar’ to speak about the post-
1988 era, ‘Burma’ to speak about previous eras, and ‘Burmese’ to refer to the 
whole population of the country, while acknowledging that none of these 
terms are uncontested. 
2. Available at www.facebook.com/PaungKu. Paung Ku is a Yangon-based 
civil society-strengthening initiative established in 2007.
3. Some improvements in Burmese organizations’ room for maneuver since 
2011 are acknowledged by my respondents; however, the situation has not 
changed completely as many organizations are still testing the waters and 
continue to experience certain levels of repression.
4. Buddhist leaders have also been involved in political struggles against 
oppression by the British colonizers and the subsequent military governments. 
Th e question to what extent Buddhism in Myanmar can be considered 
‘politicized’ forms a separate debate that is beyond the scope of this paper.
5. In 2014, China announced plans to initiate an Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank to fund various infrastructure projects in Myanmar and 
other regional countries (Brookes, 2014).
6. See http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/guidelines-English-offi  cial.pdf
7. See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS
8. ‘Logframe’ stands for ‘logical framework,’ a standardized way to determine 
the content, output, and goals of a particular project. ‘SMART’ refers to 
goals that are specifi c, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-based. See 
Edwards and Hulme, 1998, p.13.
9. For an example of a donor-funded manual, see the ‘top download’ on the 
website of the Yangon-based Local Resource Centre that seeks to empower 
civil society organizations: http://lrcmyanmar.org/en/system/fi les/book/5.a_
proposal_writing_english.pdf
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10. Paung Ku Forum, 28 March 2012.
11. His comments referred specifi cally to the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, which were not active in the country when I initiated 
my research, but later returned in response to the political liberalization. 
Th e many companies that started entering the country reportedly also made 
use of ‘consultation meetings,’ where in reality information about plans that 
aff ected people’s livelihoods was only conveyed in one direction.
12. See http://stuff expataidworkerslike.com/2011/02/16/24-facipulation/
13. On the Myanmar Peace Support Initiative, which ran from 2012 until 
2014, see Hindstrom (2014). On the 2014 census, see Ferguson (2015) and 
Nilsen & Tønnesson (2014).
14. Hargrave (2014) describes the Th ai government’s attempt to encourage 
repatriation of Burmese refugees since 2011, but especially since the new 
Th ai leadership after the coup in May 2014.
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